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I. INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology, is beneficially shifting the paradigms 2 by which soci-
ety understands, imitates, and controls the biochemical, physiological,
and pathological processes of living organisms. However biotechnol-
1. "Biotechnology, broadly defined, includes any technique that uses living orga-
nisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or ani-
mals, or to develop micro-organisms for specific uses." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BA-370, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENT-
ING LIFE-SPEcIAL REPORT 29 (1989) [hereinafter PATENTING LIFE].
2. Paradigms provide the frameworks within which we perceive the world around
us. They are not constant. As paradigms shift, society rejects its existing perception of
its universe in favor of another universe that frequently is incompatible with the former.
Each shift in perception raises elusive questions that challenge our notions of ethics
and morality. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 6
1
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ogy is also perceived as a threat to fundamental paradigms which
premise society's notions of mankind's domination over the environ-
ment. One area in which our paradigms are increasingly threatened is
the emerging sphere of patenting transgenic animals.3 Indeed, the
controversy embroiling animal patents reflects the continuing debate
surrounding human evolutionary history.4
At the controversy's core is the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"). On April 7, 1987, the PTO announced that it would
begin accepting applications for patents5 on genetically altered ani-
mals. 6 Nearly one year later, the PTO granted the first animal patent
to researchers at Harvard University7 to protect a mouse that they had
genetically engineered.8
Despite the Constitutional basis for patents9 and the societal and
economic benefits that biotechnology can provide,O many oppose bio-
technology in general, and the patenting of animals in particular, on
the basis of moral dilemma. Some inveigh against animal patenting
(1970). Changes in perception of our known universe, and the controversy that ensues,
are the characteristics that define the paradigmatic shift that is the focus of this Note.
3. Transgenic animals are created by transferring genes from an organism of one
species to an organism of another species using recombinant DNA techniques. PATENT-
ING LIFE, supra note 1, at 187.
4. SeeJACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 20-24 (1973).
In every age there is a turning-point, a new way of seeing and asserting the
coherence of the world. It is frozen in the statues of Easter Island that put a
stop to time - and in the medieval clocks in Europe that once also seemed to
say the last word about the heavens forever. Each culture tries to fix its vision-
ary moment, when it was transformed by a new conception either of nature or
of man. But in retrospect, what commands our attention as much are the
continuities - the thoughts that run or recur from one civilization to
another.
Id.
5. Patents are "a grant of a right to exclude others from the making, using or
selling of an invention during a specified time." BARRON'S LAw DICTIONARY 337 (Steven
H. Gifis ed., 2d ed. 1984).
6. See Nonnaturally Occurring Non-Human Animals Are Patentable Under § 101,
33 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPvRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 827, at 664 (April 23, 1987).
7. Malcolm Gladwell, Harvard Scientists Win Patent For Genetically Altered Mouse;
Award Is First to Be Issued for an Animal, WAsH. PosT, April 12, 1988, at Al. The patent
was granted to two Harvard University scientists for development of a laboratory mouse
that propagates a gene inserted from another animal which makes the mouse more
likely to develop cancer. Id.
8. Genetic engineering or recombinant DNA ("rDNA") technology is the con-
trolled joining of DNA from different organisms. PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 7.
After a five year hiatus during which animal patents were not granted, the PTO
issued three new animal patents in December 1992. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Resumes
Granting Patents on Genetically Altered Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at Al, D5. See,
U.S. PAT. No. 5,175,383; U.S. PAT. No. 5,175,384; U.S. PAT. No. 5,175,385.
9. "The Congress shall have Power to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also infra part III.
10. See infra part IV.
[Vol. 20
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss1/4
ANIMAL PATENTS
because it involves research on live animals;1 others contend that the
potential for risk and abuse is too great to justify the ostensible benefits
of genetic engineering. 12 Although opponents argue that withholding
animal patents would confine biotechnological research to acceptable
limits and, thus, eradicate these problems, denial will only drive inven-
tors to other means of protecting their research.1a And society likely
will suffer the consequences of this undesirable shift.
Encumbering the patent statute with moral values may effectively
preclude patents on living organisms and it contravenes the very goals
of the patent system. Moral considerations are inconsistent with prior
legislation14 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Congres-
sional intent of the Patent Act. 15 But because the standards provided
by prior legislation and Supreme Court decisions are hopelessly
clouded, the PTO has almost no guidance in the unprecedented area
of animal patents. 16 Therefore, this Comment encourages Congress to
analyze the standards by which animal patents are granted and to de-
velop appropriate means for utilizing the results.
Congress, in developing such standards, is advised to respect the
Constitution's goal of stimulating inventions. Ironically, many who
challenge biotechnology also look to the Constitution for support, con-
tending that animal patents are an unconstitutional expansion of the
patent system. These opponents contend that the drafters of the Con-
stitution never conceived that a patent would be granted on living or-
ganisms. 17 While this is no doubt true, it can similarly be said that the
drafters never imagined that a patent would be granted on airplanes or
supercomputers. Regardless of the extent of their vision about specific
inventions to which patents might be granted, the framers clearly saw
11. See Gladwell, supra note 7, at Al (identifying organizations that have lobbied
Congress to ban animal patents).
12. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and
Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1057-58 (1988) (stating that objections to
animal patenting technology include the possibility of immediate direct or indirect eco-
logical disasters and a reduction in the gene pool).
13. See infra part III.B.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1980). Known as the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innova-
tion Act, this law was created to improve the economic, environmental, and social well-
being of the United States by encouraging the growth of technology research.
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 1979,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952), in finding "that Congress intended statutory subject mat-
ter to include anything under the sun that is made by man[,]" except for discoveries that
are natural phenomenon that cannot be reserved to any one person). See also infra
notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see also Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Ani-
mals, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 4-6 (1987) (statement of Dr.
Rene Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner for Patents, U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice) (testifying on the PTO's authority for granting animal patents).
17. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1994]
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and embraced the merits of stimulating research for the benefit of so-
ciety through granting patents.lS Be the object of patenting mice or
machine, the constitutional patent provision must be read the same.
This Comment considers the benefits and pitfalls of animal patent-
ing. Part II examines the context and history of the controversy sur-
rounding animal patents. Part III compares the policies and property
rights protected by the patent system with those addressed by trade
secret law. Part V provides a working definition and overview of the
historical role of patent protection in biotechnological advance-
ments.' 9 Part IV analyzes the moral and economic arguments ad-
vanced by those who oppose extending biotechnological patents to
genetically engineered animals and finds that the arguments fail when
applied against legal, biological, and economic reality. More impor-
tant, this Comment suggests that such antipathy, although professed to
be in opposition to animal patents, is actually a resistance to the para-
digmatic leap of human control over the living world.
II. THE TRANSGENICS CONTROVERSY
The animal patenting controversy arises in basically two paradig-
matic contexts. One paradigm focuses on the ethics of granting prop-
erty rights in living animals;20 the other involves the morality of
humans using genetic engineering technology to affect the living
world around us. 2 1 Although the controversy has been staged as a
challenge to the ethics of property rights in animals, the true contro-
versy appears to reside in the challenge to human morality itself.
18. See infra part III.A.2.
19. Included is a discussion of the logical extension of "old biotechnology" into
"new biotechnology." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BA-360,
NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 3 (1988)
[hereinafter U.S. INVESTMENT]. Old biotechnology refers to the use of microorganisms
for brewing and baking. Id. New biotechnology refers to recombinant DNA technol-
ogy, cell fusion, and other novel techniques. Id.
In addition, there is a discussion on the logical extension of patent protection from
bacterial fermentation to mammalian transgenics. Transgenic animals are those that
carry genes not native to that animal. Rudolph Jaenisch, Transgenic Animals, 240 SCI.
1468, 1468 (1988).
20. Prior to the Harvard patent, patents had been issued for nonanimal life forms.
See, e.g., Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985) (upholding patents on
plants); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding patents on micro-
organisms).
21. See generally Baruch A. Brody, An Evaluation of the Ethical Arguments Commonly
Raised Against the Patenting of Transgenic Animals, in ANIMAL PATENTS: THE LEGAL, ECo-
NOMIC, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 141, 145-46 (William H. Lesser ed. 1989) (defining policy
concerns that include a decline in the belief in the sanction and dignity of life).
[Vol. 20
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Change creates tension which induces paradigmatic shifts which, in
turn, forces us to reevaluate our ethos.22 Ownership of property rights
in an animal is not new to our or any other civilized society;23 the use
of genetic engineering to create a patentable animal, however, is.24
The tension inherent in our ability to modify the genetic composition
of living animals has created a significant challenge to our fundamen-
tal ethos. Absent the intervention of science, the modification of an
organism's genetic material ("DNA")25 was historically nature's exclu-
sive jurisdiction. Nature governed random mutation of DNA, causing
living organisms to evolve into the species we know today. 26 Genetic
engineering, however, shattered nature's monopoly on evolution.
One author has speculated that, "humans have graduated from being
subjects of evolution to being co-authors of evolution."27 By harnes-
sing nature's power through DNA molecule manipulation, humans
have altered their role in nature.
The dilemmas that arise when humans usurp a power of nature is
not new. As one commentator noted:
Every machine is a kind of draught animal - even the nuclear reac-
tor. It increases the surplus that man has won from nature since the
beginning of agriculture. And therefore every machine re-enacts the
original dilemma: does it deliver energy in response to the demand
of its specific use, or is it a maverick source of energy beyond the
limits of constructive use? The conflict in the scale of power goes
back all the way to that formative time in human history. 28
These same considerations apply to biotechnology. Biotechnological
innovation is a powerful tool that can help us to understand and cure
many evasive physiological and environmental ailments. 2 9 But, like
22. A quintessential paradigmatic challenge and the human response it evoked oc-
curred when Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) challenged the Ptolemaic model of a geo-cen-
tered universe with proof of the Copernican heliocentric universe. To avoid being
tortured for heresy, he signed a statement recanting his discoveries. BRONOWSlo, supra
note 4, at 216. See also infra text accompanying notes 255-58.
23. For example, people have owned dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animal
species for a variety of purposes and reasons.
24. The PTO issued the first patent on an animal in 1988 for a mouse carrying a
recombinant gene making it prone to cancer. Gladwell, supra note 7, at Al.
25. DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid, an organic substance found in chromo-
somes located near the nucleus of cells that carries genetic instructions. ALBERT L.
LEHNINGER, BIocHEMIsTRY 309 (2d ed. 1975).
26. THE BODY MACHINE: YOUR HEALTH IN PERSPEcriVE 13 (Christian Barnard ed.,
1981).
27. Terri A. Jones, Note, Patenting Transgenic Animals: When the Cat's Away, The Mice
Will Play, 17 VT. L. REV. 875, 875 (1993).
28. BRONOWSKI, supra note 4, at 79.
29. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, REPORT ON NA-
TIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY 2-4 (1991) [hereinafter BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY] (dis-
cussing examples of biotechnological innovation in medicine, agriculture, energy and
the environment).
1994]
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many scientific advances, biotechnology threatens potential harm at
the same time it promises good. Research carries risk. Hence, within
the animal patent controversy resides a dilemma: should research be
stifled for fear of potential harm or fostered in an effort to reap the
social benefits of technology?
This dichotomy lies at the heart of the animal patenting debate. Op-
ponents of animal patents believe that denying patents will defeat bi-
otechnological research on live animals.30 It will not. The research
will continue. Moreover, denial of animal patents will change the way
in which the technology becomes available and is used.3 '
Our society demands biotechnology and, indeed, relies on it for sur-
vival. Without biotechnology, we are effectively prevented from devis-
ing the much needed solutions to dietary, health, environmental and
other problems that plague us at record rates.3 2 But balanced against
these needs is immense public resistance to increasing taxes to pay for
research and development.3 3 Thus far, biotechnology has managed to
work within relatively tight financial parameters. Biotechnology has
significantly enhanced our ability to diagnose34 and treat diseases,
3 5
produce food for human and animal consumption,3 6 and care for the
environment at a comparably small cost to the public. As societal
needs increase, so will the demand for biotechnology's benefits.
Private researchers will continue to provide us with biotechnological
benefits only if their investment is protected. Although patents protect
private investment in biotechnological innovation, denial of patent
protection on biotechnological innovations will not stifle the technol-
ogy;3 7 it will, however, drive inventors to use other means of intellec-
30. See Gladwell, supra note 7, at Al (indicating the groups that are pushing for
Congress to block animal patents).
31. See infra part V.
32. Donald S. Chisum, Introduction, 68 DENy. U. L. REv. 119, 119 n.1 (1991).
33. Id.
34. Jerry M. Adams & Suzanne Cory, Transgenic Models of Tumor Development, 254
Sci. 1161, 1161 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, New Targets for Human Gene Therapy, 241 Sci. 906, 906
(1988) (describing the use of human gene therapy to treat familial hypercholester-
olemia ("FH"), a disease which frequently causes death of affected persons while in
their teens).
36. See, e.g., Catharine M. Lemieux & Michael K. Wohlgenant, Ex Ante Evaluation of
the Economic Impact of Agricultural Biotechnology: The Case of Porcine Somatotropin, 71 Am. J.
Aciuc. ECON. Ass'N 903 (1989) (using a linear elasticity model, the authors found that
use of porcine somatotropin will increase producer surplus by $250-750 million dollars
and consumer surpluses between $900 million and $1.95 billion).
37. It will, however, shift the financial burden of research funding from private
industry to government. For example, there have been recent legislative efforts in
forming cooperatives between private industry and governmentally funded research.
15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1980).
[Vol. 20
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tual property protection.38 Trade secret law is one such alternative,
but not an attractive one.3 9 By its very nature, trade secret law de-
mands keeping vital research information secret. This secrecy encour-
ages unnecessary duplicative research, a situation successfully avoided
under patent protection. Moreover, denying animal patents will likely
impede regulatory efforts and may result in increased harm to
animals.40
This Comment posits that Congress must respond to animal patent-
ing issues. To promote societal benefits of biotechnology and to mini-
mize risks, Congress must expressly support animal patents; only
through this express support will society benefit most.
III. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
The importance of property rights41 in intellectual creations of in-
ventors and artists has sparked little controversy, perhaps because such
rights are founded in the Constitution. The Constitution empowers
Congress to grant inventors and artists exclusive proprietary rights of a
limited duration in their intellectual creations.42 The Constitution,
however, is not the sole source for these protections.
Common law also recognizes the importance of protecting property
rights in inventions through the judicial doctrine of trade secret law.43
Both patent and trade secret laws protect intellectual creations, but
38. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Exper-
imental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1017, 1032 (1989).
39. See infta part III.B-C.
40. Ironically, this is also a complaint of opponents to animal patents. See infra part
V.A.3.
41. The term "property right" is a bit of a misnomer. During the evolution of pat-
ent grants, specifically in the early 1800s, some countries, France among them, recog-
nized the grant of a patent as a proprietary right in the invention. SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 3 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter ECo-
NOMIC REVIEW]. England regarded a patent as a grant of a royal favor and Austria in-
sisted that the inventor was not entitled to protection but, as a matter of public policy,
may be granted a privilege if it was in the public interest. Id.
The United States recognized this distinction early in its history when Thomas Jef-
ferson wrote:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give
an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to man
to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done,
according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or com-
plaint from anybody.
Walton Hamilton & Irene Till, What is a Patent?, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 245, 246
(1948) (citing 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854))
(emphasis added).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
See also infra part III.B.
1994]
7
Chiapetta: Of Mice and Machine: A Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation o
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
they do so through different, and often inimical, means.4 4 Depending
on the means adopted, the inventor or artist must choose either the
protection of patent or trade secret law.45 The ramifications of that
choice affect not only the inventor, but also society at large.46 Whether
an inventor or artist opts for statutory patent protection or judicially
based trade secret law involves an evaluation of the rights and obliga-
tions created by each.
A. The Patent System
1. Benefits of Patents
The Framers of the Constitution granted Congress the power to pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts47 which Congress ef-
fectuated through the issuance of patents. 48 Although other means
were available at drafting, the Framers believed that a patent most
fairly compensated the inventor's effort with minimal intrusion of free
market tenets.
49
A patent promotes development of the sciences by providing an eco-
nomic incentive to inventors. When they are granted a patent, inven-
tors obtain exclusive commercial use of their invention for seventeen
years. 50 Armed with this limited monopoly, the inventor is able to re-
cover costs incurred in inventing.51 Society thus rewards the inventor's
44. See Thomas G. Field Jr., BriefSurvey of Intellectual Property, 31 IDEAJ.L. & TECH.
84 (1988), for a discussion of the methods available to protect intellectual property.
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 101-307 (1988) (patent act); see generally infra notes 82-102 and
accompanying text for a discussion of trade secret law.
46. See infra part III.
47. S. REP. No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836). See also supra note 9.
48. See generally Hamilton & Till, supra note 41, at 246 (stating that a patent serves a
public purpose for the advancement of the sciences and useful arts and it is solely for
this purpose that Congress is empowered to grant a patent).
49. James Madison, generally credited as the author of the Constitutional patent
clause, originally proposed the use of premiums and other provisions to reward inven-
tors for their creations. Hamilton & Till, supra note 41, at 247-48. The use of patents
ultimately prevailed over the use of government paid premiums because it was recog-
nized that determining how important an invention might be at the time of invention is
impossible. Id. at 248.
50. The standard patent term is seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Title II
of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 is one excep-
tion to this term. Id. § 271(e). In this act, Congress added section 156 to the Patent
Act, which extended the patent term to include the time pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers' products are delayed by the regulatory approval process. 15 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
See also EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF TnE COMPETI-
TIVE PROCESS 853 (rev. 4th ed. 1991).
51. A patent grant only entitles the inventor to a commercial market. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BA-494, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECON-
oMY, 204 (1991) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMY]. Use of the product, however, is sub-
ject to state and federal regulation. Id.
[Vol. 20
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contribution by providing the opportunity for an economic return.52
An invention lacking societal demand, however, will not return the
costs of development.53
Participants in the Constitutional Convention recognized that, by
creating a limited monopoly, the patent was contrary to free market
tenets. 5 4 These patent rights, however, were expressly exempted from
the general rule against monopolies,55 which Congress justified by the
greater societal benefit gained by stimulating innovation. 56 The signif-
icance of a patent's monopoly power is even more profound in mod-
ern industrial society.57 By offering a limited monopoly, the patent
system induces companies to make and perfect products for the com-
mercial market.58 It provides a critical economic incentive for private
52. See, e.g., Hamilton & Till, supra note 41, at 248. A patent merely establishes the
boundaries of the inventor's exclusive rights as fixed by the invention:
All the ways and means of securing his "reward" are left to the inventor; all the
risks which attend "putting it to work" are for him to avoid. The government,
in issuing the grant, guarantees to him no compensation; it assures him no
right to do whatever is necessary to make his patent a commercial success.
Id.
53. A patent only provides the patentee with the right to exclude others from their
market. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
54. See generally S. REP. No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836).
55. "It is not at this day to be doubted that the evil of the temporary monopoly is
greatly overbalanced by the good the community ultimately derives from its toleration."
Id. at 6.
Even today, debate over the societal benefits of patent protection, the suppression
of inventiveness that can result when patents are blocked, and the negative economic
effects created by a limited monopoly rages on. This essay does not seek to rewrite
patent law. Rather, it argues in support of the tenets that justify the system's present
existence. However, for incisive essays on the effects of the patent system on scientific
innovation, see generally ECONOMIC REVIEw, supra note 41, which provides a historical
review of the arguments of patent system opponents and proponents; Eisenberg, supra
note 38, discussing the patent system's effect on basic science research; Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
839 (1990), which explores the effects of patent scope on fostering and inhibiting inno-
vation); and Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977), discussing the patent system as a means toward more efficient tech-
nological expansion.
56. S. REP. No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836).
57. ECONOMIC REVIEw, supra note 41, at 35.
58. Id. at 37.
The risk attending the introduction of a new process is always great. Even
when it works thoroughly well in the laboratory or model room, it may not
work well in public. The man who first develops a new invention loses his
whole capital if it fails. If he is immediately exposed to free competition in
case of success, he can enjoy exceptional profits for a short time only. The risk
of loss, under such circumstances, outweighs the possibility of gain. No man
[...] will take the lead in a hazardous experiment when those who follow him
have practically equal chance of gain and almost no chance of loss. The pat-
ent, by making the gain a permanent one, makes it safe for a capitalist to
develop a new process.
Id. (citing A.T. HADLEY, ECONOMICS 133-34 (1903)).
1994]
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investment in sophisticated research laboratories and in the hiring of
trained professionals to develop new and necessary societal goods.59
Rewarding the entrepreneurial spirit also creates economic security
through jobs and satisfies consumer needs for new products. 60
Although society as a whole benefits from patent protection, the
true benefit of a patent system is, unfortunately, unmeasurable. 6 1 The
factors considered in granting a patent, specifically the scope and du-
ration of patent protection, have different stimulatory effects in differ-
ent areas of manufacturing. 62 Regardless of these differences,
however, it is widely accepted that the societal benefit that is gained by
granting patents far outweighs the potential harm of
monopolization.6S
A patent grant is often referred to as a contractual agreement be-
tween the patentee and society. The inventor provides public disclo-
sure6 4 of the workings of a "new"6 5 and "useful"66 invention. In
exchange, society grants the patentee the exclusive right to use the
state's enforcement power to prohibit another from commercially us-
ing the patented invention.67 The inventor secures a monopoly right
while society receives two distinct benefits from a patent: (1) the inven-
tor will more likely expend the costs required to make the product
59. Id. at 35.
For the inventors in the laboratories, the modem incentive is probably pref-
erable to the old. These men are specialists, professionals who like their work.
Where society accords scientists and inventors steady income, respect, a ca-
reer, and a laboratory, it is safe to assume that most prefer these emoluments,
facilities, and associations to the uncertainties of isolated research and busi-
ness adventure.
Id. (citing Alfred E. Kahn, Deficiencies of American Patent Law, 30 Am. ECON. REv.
479, 481 (1940)).
60. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
61. ECONOMIC REvIEW, supra note 41, at 79. However, there is some empirical evi-
dence to support the notion that patents are beneficial in certain sectors. See, e.g., John
H. Barton, Patenting Life, 264 Sci. AM. 40, 40, 42 (1991) (stating that private plant breed-
ing increased following the introduction of plant variety patenting rights in 1970). The
pharmaceutical industry is one industry for which the effect of patent incentive is great.
Id. at 41. It is reasonable that patent incentive will be equally effective in biotechnology.
Id.
62. Merges, supra note 12.
63. Barton, supra note 61, at 1.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
Id.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
66. Id.
67. ECONOMIC REaviw, supra note 41, at 1.
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available in the market place; 68 and (2) the knowledge becomes avail-
able for building incremental technological advancement. 69 Thus, a
patent not only stimulates production of societally useful products, but
it also mandates disclosure of the vital information that advances the
solution of social problems. These benefits should not be
underestimated.
In addition to satisfying the disclosure condition, an inventor must
fulfill three additional statutory requirements to secure patent protec-
tion. First, the invention must be a form of technological advance-
ment that Congress wishes to foster through patenting.70 Second, the
invention must be novel.71 And third, the invention must be one that
would not be obvious to others who are reasonably skilled in the area
of technology relevant to the invention.72 Congress has imposed these
requirements to guarantee that society benefits from the novel inven-
tion while allowing the inventor to recoup the costs of developing the
technology. It is only when society receives full disclosure and the in-
ventor receives full protection that the benefits of the patent system
are fully realized.
2. Patents of Living Animals
In 1980, the courts first considered whether "living organisms" are
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act. In Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty,73 the Supreme Court reviewed the pertinent lan-
guage of section 101 that defines patentable subject matter as "any new
68. Id. at 58-59.
69. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1024.
70. The Patent Act provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1988); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (determining the novelty necessary for a patent).
Novelty, as used in patents, measures how "new" a prospective invention really is. An
invention is considered "novel" when it is not known by others and has not been used
before. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
A patent may not be obtained .. .if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id. This Comment focuses on subject matter propriety for patent protection; novelty
and nonobviousness are thus beyond its scope.
73. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter"7 4
and held that living subject matter may be patented.7 5
The Court, affirming the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("CCPA"), specifically focused on the statutory terms "manufacture"
and "composition of matter."7 6 Applying standard dictionary defini-
tions to these statutory terms, the Court determined that Congress in-
tended the patent laws to be given "wide scope." 77 This "wide scope"
meant that the patent laws are not restricted to inanimate objects;78
they specifically encompass living organisms as well. The Court also
pronounced that arguments against patentability which invoke poten-
tial hazards are properly addressed by Congress and the Executive
branch, not the courts. 79 But, in the thirteen years since Chakrabarty,
Congress has taken no action to clarify the scope of section 101 in this
area. Thus, both courts and practitioners are left with only a clouded
vision regarding the limits of Chakrabarty and the true scope of section
101.
The function of the patent system is simple: "To promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts."80 The boundaries of "science" and
"useful arts" are vague at best. Within these boundaries, however, the
vanguard of the biotechnological community is altering the genetic
makeup of living organisms. Undoubtedly, potential harms are associ-
ated with these endeavors.S1 But, as indicated by the Supreme Court
in Chakrabarty, the resolution of an invention's potential harms is not
properly within the scope of the patent office. A societal issue of this
magnitude is best left to the judgment of Congress.8 2
74. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
75. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318.
76. Id. at 308. The CCPA had reversed the Patent Board of Appeals' denial of a
patent for a genetically engineered bacteria. The new strain of bacteria, from the
Pseudomonas genus, had unique degradative capabilities as a result of genetic engineer-
ing and, therefore, was useful in cleaning up oil spills. See Michael B. Landau, Multicel-
lular Vertebrate Mammals as "Patentable Subject Matter" Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Promotion of
Science and the Useful Arts or an Open Invitation for Abuse?, 97 DicK. L. REv. 203, 209-10
(1993).
77. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. The Court went on to note that the committee
reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act revision "inform us that Congress intended
statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.' " Id.
at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
78. Id. at 313.
79. Id. at 317.
80. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
81. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
82. Id. at 317; see also Stephen A. Bent, Issues and Prospects in the USA, in ANIMAL
PATENTS: THE LEcAL, ECONOMIC & SocIAL ISSuES 5, 7 (William H. Lesser ed., 1989).
Congress delegated its authority to regulate the general issuance of patents in 1836
when it established the PTO. S. REP. No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836).
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B. Trade Secret
In contrast to patent law protection, which was created by legisla-
tion, trade secret protection evolved through common law.83 In 1939,
section 757 of the First Restatement of Torts was created as a codifica-
tion of trade secret law.8 4 Although there have been attempts to im-
pose statutory effect through adoption of the Uniform Trade Secret
Act ("UTSA"),85 trade secret protection is still found within the com-
mon law.86
Trade secret laws evolved from a different orientation than patent
laws. Unlike patent laws, which protect inventions, trade secret laws
protect consumers from unfair competition.8 7 Trade secret laws pro-
tect consumers by assuring that a known product will come only from a
known producer. Although they do not purport to promote inven-
tions, trade secret laws provide protection to the inventor by prevent-
ing misappropriation of the fruits of their labor through the benefits
of trade secret laws.88
Trade secret laws protect consumers by: (1) enforcing standards of
commercial morality;8 9 (2) stimulating investment into positive eco-
It is interesting to note the role of regulatory agencies in patent issues. Histori-
cally, patents on medical products were denied because of the potential medical fraud
that could arise. Merges, supra note 12, at 1064. However, after the development of the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in 1927-31, the courts, when upholding a pat-
ent, look to functional utility concerns, as opposed to clinical safety concerns that
would fall within the ambit of the FDA. Id. This prevents the overlap of PTO and FDA
jurisdictions. Id.
83. Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 293,
300 (1992).
84. RESTATEMENT (Fins-r) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). The Second Restatement no
longer incorporates this section.
85. Field, supra note 44, at 109. The UTSA has been adopted in whole or in part in
various states. Id.
86. Id. State law occasionally overlaps patent protection, but it has been held that
federal law does not preempt state trade secret law. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165-68 (1989). The Court made clear that although
federal and state laws could co-exist, state laws which acted to undermine the purpose
of federal patent policy were preempted. Id. at 146-51.
87. Trade secret law may create "quasi-property rights" in inventors. Id. at 157.
The focus, however, is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers
as an incentive to product innovation. Id. The general concern of unfair competition
is that, without some identifying feature on the product, consumers may be unable to
discern the product's source, making it difficult for consumers to repurchase products
of their choice. Id.
88. "[B]ut one may not avoid these labors [of independent research] by taking the
process from the discoverer without his permission at a time when he is taking reason-
able precautions to maintain its secrecy." E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,
431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970).
89. "To obtain knowledge of a process without spending the time and money to
discover it independently is improper unless the holder voluntarily discloses it or fails to
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nomic interests;90 and (3) encouraging research and innovation.91 As
in patent law, a fundamental tension arises in attaining the goals of
trade secret law. The benefit of protecting inventive efforts clashes
with, and must be balanced against, the societal harm of single source
pricing. However, this balance favors protecting a producer to the ex-
tent of the producer's own reasonable efforts to keep the technology
secret.92 Thus, by protecting their secrets, producers are able to keep
their products distinct from the competition.
Therefore, unlike patents, which require public disclosure, trade se-
cret law provides an incentive to inventors to keep their ideas secret.9 3
Apart from any disclosure that might be obtained by commercial mar-
keting of a product, no other disclosure is required of an inventor. In
fact, in a trade secret dispute, the inventor bears the burden to prove
that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent disclosure of the
workings of the invention. 94 A product protected by trade secret is
protected until the secret is revealed and the duration can theoreti-
cally last forever.9 5
In practice, however, it is unlikely that many products will maintain
their trade secret protection forever. If an invention can be easily du-
plicated as the result of product inspection or reverse engineering, the
product loses its trade secret protection.96 Thus, an invention legally
"discovered" before the seventeen-year patent term has expired allows
society to benefit from free market competition sooner than it would
under patent law. But, on the other hand, if an invention is a major
advancement that is not amenable to reverse engineering, society may
not receive this benefit; in fact society may suffer two harms. First, the
negative effect of single-source pricing will continue longer than seven-
teen years of patent protection. 97 Second, without disclosure, the col-
lateral benefit of incremental discovery beyond the invention is
take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy." Id. at 1015-16. This is the essence of
commercial immorality.
90. Id. at 1016.
91. Id.
92. Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1986).
93. PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 118-19.
94. Metallurgical Indus., 790 F.2d at 1200; see also E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970).
95. Field, supra note 44, at 112. See, e.g., Manuel Schiffres & Gail Bronson, Busi-
nesses Struggle to Keep Their Secrets, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Sept. 23, 1985, at 59 (dis-
cussing how Coca-Cola has managed to keep its recipe for Coke a secret for ninety-nine
years).
96. E.I. duPont, 431 F.2d at 1015.
97. One commentator has noted that if secrecy for greater than seventeen years is
"feasible," patents may be an unattractive alternative for an inventor. Eisenberg, supra
note 38, at 1029.
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effectively prevented.98 As a result, society cannot realize the full bene-
fit of the research.
These harms are even greater in the biotechnological community.
Biotechnology, perhaps more so than any other industry, requires
maximal disclosure to provide societal benefit. From an economic per-
spective, biotechnology is not easily reverse engineered by inspection
of the product.99 Second, disclosure permits regulators to gain in-
creased knowledge about the respective technology thus making them
better equipped to enact proper regulation. Third, disclosure pro-
vides the foundation upon which incremental discoveries are built.100
C. Patents vs. Trade Secrets
The choice between the means of intellectual property protection
makes a difference in the stimulatory effect on technological advance-
ment. Patents, on the one hand, provide broad protection from free
market competition. Trade secret law, however, with its lack of disclo-
sure, protects the inventor to the detriment of society.' 01 The bi-
otechnological industry feeds upon this disclosure; it is only through
disclosure that society reaps the technology's benefit. The comparable
protections furnished under trade secret law simply do not fully pro-
vide those benefits.10 2
IV. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
The biotechnology industry arose in response to society's desire to
better understand and care for living organisms and their environ-
ment.1 03 Basic scientific research has provided greater understanding
of the functioning of living organisms, enabling human beings to con-
98. Id. at 1024; Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life,
28JuumETwcsJ. 399, 422 (1988).
99. Reverse engineering is difficult with living animals. For example, it is difficult
to determine what the differences are between a genetically engineered mouse and a
normal mouse just by looking at the two, because the changes to the engineered mouse
were made to its unseen genetic material. Moreover, even if newly incorporated DNA
material is determinable by genetic analysis, the method of incorporation remains
unknown.
100. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1024.
101. Field, supra note 44, at 88; Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1029 (explaining in
detail the benefits to society of disclosure and how trade secret law denies society those
benefits).
102. See, e.g., Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Sub-
Comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1987) (statement of A. Ann Sorenson, Assistant
Director, Natural & Environmental Resources Divisions, American Farm Bureau Feder-
ation) (supporting biotechnology as a way to reduce farm costs and improve the
environment).
103. See U.S. INv sTrMETr, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the many different areas of
biotechnology such as agricultural biotechnology).
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trol, imitate, and repair the biochemical, physiological, and pathologi-
cal processes of living organisms in all areas of discipline.
1 04
Biotechnology is the catalyst that transforms basic scientific research
into practical applications.10 5 It is not an isolationist industry; rather,
many other industrial sectors use biotechnology as a tool to accom-
plish their respective needs.06
A. History of Biotechnology and the Role of Patenting
Historically, dominance over plant life and domestication of animals
motivated humans to reject the nomadic ways of their ancestors.1 0 7 Ac-
cidental and selective breeding can be regarded as the earliest forms of
human genetic manipulation.' 08 Genetic engineering, therefore, is
consistent with the historical evolution of human intervention into the
living world. In time, a patent system was created to promote innova-
tion of useful products for society.' 0 9 The creation of human manipu-
lated organisms was not precluded from patent protection.110
The biotechnology industry as we know it today is less than twenty
years old.111 But, the history of patenting natural products can be
traced to the 1800s when Louis Pasteur, one of the first biotechnology
pioneers, received a patent for the process of beer fermentation in
1873.112
Soon after, patent protection was extended to living organisms
through the 1930 Plant Protection Act ("PPA").113 This act was cre-
ated to protect the financial interests of plant breeders"14 who were
concerned that reproducing asexual plant varieties could be per-
104. See, e.g., Shannon Brownlee & Joanne Silberner, The Age of Genes, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 69.
105. BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 29, at 1 n.i. Biotechnology draws for its
foundation from fields such as molecular biology, structural biology, molecular genet-
ics, immunology, cell biology, biochemical engineering, protein engineering, and tradi-
tional breeding techniques. Id.
106. See U.S. INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 3.
107. BRONOWSU, supra note 4, at 60.
108. Id. at 68.
109. See generally Hamilton & Till, supra note 41, at 245 n.1.
110. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See also PATENTING
LIFE, supra note 1, at 31.
111. GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 51, at 3. One report distinguishes between "old"
biotechnology (the use of micro-organisms for brewing and baking) and "new" biotech-
nology (recombinant DNA technology, cell fusion, and other novel techniques). See
U.S. INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 1.
112. Id. at 31. Pasteur received this patent for discovering that the process of fer-
mentation was dependent on the enzymatic action of yeast.
113. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930); H.R. Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1930).
114. Id. Prior to enactment of the PPA, federally funded agricultural research sta-
tions were the source of new varieties of plants. PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 9.
Since enactment of the PPA, 6,500 plant patents have been issued by the PTO. Id. at 10.
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formed by anyone once the process was out of the inventor's hands.'5
This protection was further enhanced in 1970, with enactment of the
Plant Variety Protection Act ("PPVA"),116 which extended breeders'
protection to sexually reproducing plants."
7
In 1985 the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals further
expanded patent protection ruling that, under the Patent Act, explicit
provisions for patenting living organisms were not needed.1 8 In Ex
parte Hibberd, 119 the board reversed a patent examiner's denial of a pat-
ent for a maize plant that produced seeds with increased levels of
amino acids.12o The examiner asserted that, because Congress had
specifically carved out protection of plant breeders' rights under the
PPA and PPVA, these statutes provided the exclusive proprietary rights
available. t2 1 Reversing, the board held that nothing in the Patent Act
excluded the granting of utility patents for new varieties of plants.' 2 2
115. PATENTING LiFE, supra note 1, at 9.
116. Id. at 10-11. The PPVA was enacted after the International Union for the Pro-
tection of New Varieties ("UPOV") was formed by European countries. The UPOV
provided plant breeders of member nations with breeders' rights. The United States
enacted the PVPA to give United States breeders rights in sexually reproduced plants
that were not covered by the PPA. Id.
Congress's goal for enacting the PPVA was to provide an economic incentive for
companies to undertake the financial risks involved in developing new plant varieties.
Id. at 11. The PPVA is not a provision under the Patent Act, but is a separate piece of
legislation that provides patent-like protection administered by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture ("USDA").
117. Id. The PPVA provides for two exemptions from infringement. The first is a
research exemption that allows other researchers to use protected plant varieties to
develop new varieties. The second is a farmer exemption that allows individuals whose
primary occupation is raising crops to save subsequent generations of seed for future
use or to sell it to other similarly situated farmers. Id.
118. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444-45 (1985).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 443.
121. Id. at 444.
122. Id. As a basis for its decision, the board relied on Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980). See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. In this landmark deci-
sion, the Court reiterated the legislative intent of the Act to include as patentable "any-
thing under the sun that is made by man," Id. at 309 (citing S. REP. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
The board noted that, as stated in Chakrabary, legislative history offers two ratio-
nales for Congress's enactment of the PPA. The first was to explicitly dismiss the notion
that human-altered plant life was not patentable under the Patent Act. The other was
to relax the Patent Act's written description requirement (enablement § 112) to allow a
plant inventor to more easily obtain a patent on a new plant variety. Hibberd, 227
U.S.P.Q. at 444-45.
In the eight years since Hibberd, Congress has done nothing to refute that interpre-
tation. However, recent caselaw has suggested that the experimental use defense of
new patents should be narrowly defined. See Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical, 733
F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("We cannot construe the experimental use rule so
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when
1994]
17
Chiapetta: Of Mice and Machine: A Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation o
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Chakrabarty involved patenting a genetically altered micro-organ-
ism, 123 and Hibberd involved a genetically altered plant.1 24 It was not
until 1987 that the Board of Patent Appeals addressed the patentability
of a multicellular animal.125 In Ex parte Allen,' 26 the board rejected a
patent claim for a man-made oyster. 127 However the rejection was not
based on the fact that oysters are live animals. Instead, the board re-
jected the patent based on the obviousness provision under section
103 of the Patent Act.128 Regarding the patentability of live animals,
the board noted, that "[t]he issue . . . in determining whether the
claimed subject matter is patentable under section 101 is simply
whether the subject matter is made by man."129 Thus, the Allen Board
reaffirmed the concept that the threshold for patentability is not
whether the invention is alive, but whether it has been created by man.
Shortly after Allen was decided, the Patent Commissioner clarified
the PTO's position on patenting animals.130 On April 7, 1987 Patent
Commissioner Donald Quigg announced, in an interpretive ruling,
that "nonnaturally occurring" animals were patentable subject mat-
ter.13 1 One year later the first animal patent was granted to research-
ers at Harvard University.
1 32
that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.").
Very basically, the experimental use exception to infringement of a patent means that
the use was for an academic pursuit and not for profit. See generally Jordan P. Karp,
Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 Yale
L.J. 2169, 2170-71 (1991).
Shortly after Roche was decided, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition &
Patent Term Restoration Act, which allows for such experimental use by generic drug
manufacturers, but denies such use if it involves "commercial manufacture, use, or sale
of a drug or veterinary biological product claimed in a patent." See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)
(1988); see also Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1023 n.25.
123. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
124. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 443.
125. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1426.
128. Id.
We agree with the examiner that in view of the express recommendation by
Stanley et al., experts in the art who have successfully induced polyploidy in
one species of oysters, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art to induce polyploidy in Pacific Crassostrea gigas oysters.
Id. at 1427.
129. Id. at 1426. The Supreme Court has implied that although the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences is merely an adjudicatory body of the PTO, its decisions are
binding on the Commissioner. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523 n.6 (1966).
130. Allen was decided April 3, 1987. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987).
Quigg's announcement was made on April 7, 1987.
131. "The Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring non-
human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject mat-
ter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101." 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE PAGE NUMBER NEEDED
(1987).
132. See Gladwell, supra note 7, at Al.
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Issuance of the Harvard patent in 1987 prompted Congress to con-
sider the propriety of granting animal patents. Shortly after awarding
the patent, several bills came before the House and Senate calling for a
moratorium on animal patents;t33 but no bills then, or since, have
been enacted.134 Similarly, courts have provided little additional gui-
dance in the area of animal patents. The sole challenge to animal pat-
enting appears to have been in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg.s5
In Quigg, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied hearing
an action brought against Commissioner Quigg because the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring the suit.136 The merits of animal patenting
were never addressed. As such, neither Congress nor any federal court
has explicitly addressed the animal patenting question to offer gui-
dance in this complex, emerging legal area.
B. Biotechnology Today
The growing reach of biotechnology affects many disciplines, includ-
ing food production, energy production, and environmental clean-
up.1S7 Biotechnology's greatest benefit, however, has accrued to the
health care industry.138 These benefits are realized through genetic
133. The announcement by then Commissioner Quigg led to a number of bills in
the House and Senate proposing a moratorium on animal patents. None were passed.
See Hugo A. Delevie, Animal Patenting- Probing the Limits of U.S. Patent Laws, 74J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 493, 499 n.39-40 (1992). Congress has not provided any further
statutory guidance in this area.
134. It appears, however, that the PTO acted under a self-imposed moratorium for
five years because no new animal patents had been granted between 1987 and 1992.
Andrews, supra note 8, at Al. The hiatus ended in December 1992 with the issuance of
patents for transgenic mice to three different organizations. U.S. PAT. No. 5,175,383;
U.S. PAT. No. 5,175,384; U.S. PAT. No. 5,175,385.
135. 710 F. Supp. 728, 729 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
136. Id., certifying questions to 900 F.2d 195, 195 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 932 F.2d 920,
922 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The plaintiffs comprised individual farmers or animal husbanders
and various non-profit groups "championing" the rights of animals. 710 F. Supp. at
729. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case for failure to
state a claim. Id. Plaintiffs then appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit. 900 F.2d
at 196. In turn, the Ninth Circuit referred the case to the Federal Circuit which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction for cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Id.
137. BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 29, at 3; see also GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra
note 51, at 3.
138. GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 51, at 45. "In 1988, [Office of Technology Assess-
ment] found that human health care was the focus of research for most companies,
whether large or small. Agriculture and chemicals were the focus of far fewer firms,
and environmental applications of biotechnology were even less well represented." Id.
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therapy,13 9 pharmaceutical production,140 and understanding disease
mechanisms.14
The area of health care most significantly affected by biotechnology
is the treatment of genetic diseases, from the common cold to can-
cer. 142 Genetic engineering has already produced a vaccine that suc-
cessfully prevents viral poultry disease.143 Looking forward, extrinsic
genetic material may soon be used to treat diseases such as cystic
fibrosis.144
More recent genetic engineering advances demonstrate even more
dramatically the life-saving capacity of biotechnology in health care. In
1990, for example, the FDA approved the first clinical trial for human
gene therapy.145 One result of that study may have saved the life of a
young girl suffering from adenosine deaminase deficiency ("ADA").146
Researchers used genetic engineering technology to insert the gene
for ADA into deficient cells taken out of her body. 147 The cells con-
taining the newly incorporated gene were then reinserted into her
body, allowing her to live a healthier life. Prior to this technology,
such a disease had no chance of being treated.
Biotechnology has also enhanced the pharmaceutical industry.
Drug manufacturers can now develop complex therapeutic drugs pre-
viously not capable of being produced in laboratories.148 Another ad-
139. See, e.g., Brownlee & Silberner, supra, note 104, at 69 (discussing the treatment
of genetic disorders).
140. See, e.g., BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 29, at 3 (discussing production of
insulin).
141. See, e.g., GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 51, at 73. See also infra notes 156-58 and
accompanying text.
142. The common cold is believed to be caused by a virus which, by definition, is a
packet of genetic material that invades the host's body. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DirIONARY V-28 (13th ed. 1977). The genetic link of some cancers is well known. Id.
at C-9. Because genetic material forms the basis of these diseases, they have colloquially
been included under the general heading of genetic diseases.
143. Malcolm Gladwell, USDA's Chicken Feat: A Resistant New Breed, WASH. POST, Aug.
11, 1988, at E3. Scientists inserted genes into one day old chick embryos which blocked
the effect of the avian leukosis virus; this virus was estimated to cost U.S. egg producers
between $50 and $100 million annually. Id.
144. In 1989, scientists discovered the gene that codes for cystic fibrosis, and have
since been able to determine the structure of the protein involved. The gene has not
yet been inserted into affected humans, but it has been successfully inserted into trans-
genic mice that are secreting an enzyme into their milk. Although these mice may be
able to provide humans with this enzyme, direct insertion of the gene into affected
humans would provide a more lasting effect. Joanne Silberner, Following the Blueprint of
a Deadly Inherited Disease, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 73.
145. Brownlee & Silberner, supra note 104, at 69.
146. Id. ADA is an inherited disorder that destroys the body's immune cells; its ef-
fect is similar to that caused by Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). Id.
147. Id.
148. Erythropoietin, a drug used to treat anemia caused by bone marrow suppres-
sion, is one example of a drug that is now being produced by genetically engineered
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vantage of biotechnology is its ability to cost effectively produce
predictable amounts of essential natural products that are inherently
scarce and difficult to extract.1 49 Insulin,15 0 for example, has been tra-
ditionally collected by isolating it from the pancreas of pigs and cattle
at slaughter houses.151 As a result of genetic engineering, however,
large quantities of highly pure human insulin are produced through
genetic manipulation of bacterial organisms.152 Although genetically
altered microbial agents continue to be a viable producer of new drug
products, biotechnology is rapidly expanding into new frontiers. New
technologies will soon produce larger quantities of new drugs that can
be secreted into the milk of domestic animal species.153
A third area in which biotechnology has enhanced human health
care is through the production of animal disease models.154 The pat-
ented Harvard mouse,1 55 for example, has a higher than average pro-
pensity to develop cancer thus enabling researchers to increase the
sensitivity of detection of carcinogens and maximize the validity of
such studies. 156 Other animal models are being developed to study
such human diseases as neurofibromatosis157 and hypertension.15 8
In addition to its direct impact on health care, biotechnology indi-
rectly affects human health through the production of more whole-
some food products. The benefits of this technology were recently
microorganisms. The drug is essentially composed of a collection of protein molecules
that were too large to be created through traditional commercial synthesis. Margaret
Fischl et al., Recombinant Human Erythropoietin for Patients with ADS Treated with
Zidovudine, 322 NEw ENC. J. MED. 1488, 1492 (1990).
149. BIoT-EcHNoLocY POLICY, supra note 29, at 3.
150. Insulin is used to regulate blood sugar imbalances which occur in diabetes.
151. BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 29, at 3.
152. During the 1980s it was discovered that by inserting human gene coding for
insulin into microorganisms, a purer and more specific human form of insulin could be
produced. This technique is used for insulin production today. Id.
153. At this writing, three independent research groups are experimenting with
goat, sheep, and cattle that will secrete quantities of large complex human proteins in
their milk. Anne Simon Moffat, Transgenic Animals May Be Down on the Pharm, 254 Sci.
35, 35 (1991). These proteins include clotting factors to treat hemophilia; erythropoie-
tin to stimulate bone marrow production suppressed due to AIDS or cancer; and alpha-
1 antitrypsin (AAR), which may alleviate emphysema and other degenerative lung dis-
eases. Id.
154. Jaenisch, supra note 19, at 1468.
155. U.S. PAT. No. 4,736,866.
156. Id.
157. Steven H. Hinrichs et al., A Transgenic Mouse Model for Human Neurofibromatosis,
237 Sci. 1340, 1340 (1987). Neurofibromatosis is an autosomal dominant disease that
can cause severe cosmetic deformity. See MEDICAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
173 (JamesJ. Nora & F. Clarke Fraser eds., 1981).
158. S. Kimura et al., High Blood Pressure in Transgenic Mice Carrying the Rat Angiotensi-
nogen Gene, 11 EMBO. J. 821, 821 (1992). Hypertension refers to the elevation of sys-
tolic or diastolic blood pressure. THE MERCK MANUAL Or DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY, ch.
26, at 390-403 (R. Berkow ed., 15th ed. 1987).
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recognized by a National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") committee59
in a report proposing that, in order for Americans to achieve the
American Heart Institute reduced fat intake goals, leaner farm animals
are essential. The committee went on to suggest genetic engineering
as the source of the long term solution.160
Although it is capable of resolving a variety of enigmatic social issues,
biotechnology is not an end in and of itself. Not only must the prod-
ucts of biotechnology be applied once developed, there must be an
initial incentive to even perform the research. Biotechnology research
requires a substantial financial outlay and the private industry will only
make these investments if they receive some form of protection, usu-
ally through patents. Without this protection, the flow of competitively
priced goods will likely be inhibited.
Patent protection is particularly important to a start-up high technol-
ogy companies. 161 The inability to obtain a patent can severely limit
the investment incentive needed to finance the development of new
products and processes, and in these companies there are often signifi-
cant investment requirements with restricted available funds.' 62 Ab-
sent some form of certainty with regard to protection of intellectual
property rights, investment in research will undoubtedly be cur-
159. A three year study funded by the USDA found that thirty-six percent of Ameri-
cans' diet comes from fat. The American Heart Association, however, suggests an in-
take of not more than thirty percent fat. Most dietary fat comes from animal food
products. Although one solution to healthier diets is trimming excess fat from meats at
slaughter, the "real solution lies in the production of leaner animals... [c]hanges in
their diet, breeding, and genetic engineering will all help to produce less fatty meat."
Marjorie Sun, Designing Food by Engineered Animals, 240 Sci. 136, 136 (1988).
160. Id. The report also acknowledged that federal policies must change. For in-
stance, the USDA meat grading system continues to reward cattlemen for producing
fatter animals. Id.
Biotechnology has been applied to ensure a more constant food supply, not only
by increasing the efficiency of food production but also by making farmers less vulnera-
ble to seasonal effects. See, e.g., Lemieux & Wohlgenant, supra note 36, at 903. The
technology is helping to reduce the adverse environmental effects of agricultural prac-
tices. Council Report, Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, 265 JAMA
1429, 1429 (1991) (indicating that by 1995, genetically engineered plants will success-
fully resist insects, viruses, frost, and temperature changes).
For example, a natural product called brassinolide is being used as a plant growth
stimulator. When sprayed on plants impaired by adverse growing conditions, this prod-
uct will cause them to recover the growth and development that was retarded. N.
Bhushan Mandava, Plant Growth-Promoting Brassino-Steroids, 39 ANN. REV. PLANT PHYSIOL.
& PLANT MOL. BIOL. 23 (1988).
161. Mandava, supra note 160, at 212.
162. Id.; Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciay,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1987) (statement of Winston J. Brill, Ph.D., Vice President,
Research and Development, Agracetus Corp.) (testifying that his company, Agricetus,
depended on patent protection to "justify major investments in biotechnology").
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tailed.163 Biotechnological industries are further burdened when the
government restricts the use of newly invented products. Industries
involving food and drugs must comply with stringent regulation not
encountered by other industries.164 The rigorous safety studies im-
posed on food and drugs are costly, thus increasing the initial cost of
commercializing a product.165 These same concerns-protecting in-
vestment and the need for large initial cash outlays to accommodate
regulatory constraints-plague inventors seeking patents on
animals. 166
IV. ANALYSIS OF ANIMAL PATENTING ISSUES
The animal patenting debate is far from over. On the contrary, it
has scarcely begun. From the 1987 pronouncement of then Commis-
sioner of Patents Donald Quigg that nonnaturally occurring animals
were patentable 167 and the grant of the first animal patent in 1988, the
debate has continued to intensify.1 68
Many of those who oppose animal patenting question whether the
benefits of the technology are worth the risks,169 but until the technol-
ogy is developed, the question must remain unanswered. Without prac-
tical biotechnology research, the risks are mere speculation.70 The
arguments that most frequently arise in opposition to animal patents
likewise are based on speculative harms that involve morality and eco-
nomics. These arguments focus on: "(1) interference with the natural
world; (2) devaluation of human life; (3) survival of the family farm;
(4) commercialization of academic research; and (5) agriculture and
laboratory animal suffering."17 1 Unfortunately, when the debate over
animal patents is confined to theoretical issues of morality and eco-
nomics, core issues such as the purpose of the patent system and the
role of regulation get overlooked.
Morality is a dubious standard upon which to deny patent protec-
tion. Courts that considered early patent cases, however, withheld pat-
163. Many see intellectual property protection as a "paramount" consideration of
national competitiveness in biotechnology. GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 51, at 203.
164. U.S. INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 11.
165. Id.
166. See supra part III.A.
167. Brody, supra note 21, at 141.
168. See PATENTING LIF, supra note 1, at 12.
169. See, e.g., John B. Attanasio, The Genetic Revolution: What Lawyers Don't Know, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 662, 714 (1988) (stating caution is essential when encountering such a
multifaceted area as biotechnology that may well produce untold benefits).
170. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 27, at 909; Merges, supra note 12, at 1059; PATENTING
LIFE, supra note 1, at 17.
171. Dresser, supra note 98, at 410; see also PATENTING LiE, supra note 1, at 18;
Brody, supra note 21, at 142-50 (discussing similar concerns).
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ents when they perceived an immoral purpose or utility.172 In these
cases, denial was justified as an effort to preclude (1) inventions that
served no purpose other than to defy a readily identifiable norm; or
(2) inventions that could only be used for fraudulent purposes.
Gambling devices are examples of inventions whose sole purposes
were considered a contravention of readily identifiable norms. In the
early nineteenth century, patents were frequently denied on gambling
devices because gambling was believed to be "morally wrong."17 3 By
the 1970s this trend reversed, 174 partly because gambling was no
longer a "major moral issue" and partly because courts found that the
moral-worth test was an indeterminate standard.175 "Miracle cures" in
medicine exemplify inventions that were deemed to be used for fraud-
ulent purposes.1 76 Patents on dubious medical treatments were sys-
tematically denied before the FDA was established to regulate medical
drugs and devices. 17 7
In the foregoing examples, patents were denied on products whose
utility was limited to immoral or fraudulent purposes. In the case of
animal patents, however, the patentable invention arguably offers a
beneficial use.1 78 Thus, concern that societal benefit might be out-
weighed by the ostensible immorality of human dominance should be
immaterial for PTO purposes. The proper venue for consideration of
moral issues of biotechnology is within the regulatory agency entrusted
with the product's oversight, not the PTO.179
172. See generally Merges, supra note 12, at 1062.
173. Id. at 1063.
174. Id.
175. Id. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (holding that
Connecticut statutes were unconstitutional which imposed criminal sanctions for pro-
viding contraceptive devices). Thus birth control devices, once considered illegal, are
now recognized as socially useful to prevent population explosion. With regard to this
transition, one commentator notes: "[1]n determining 'utility' based on public mores,
the courts should apply a test which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient
enough to be anticipating basic needs of a society changed by forces yet unrecognized
by the general public." R. CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 76 (3d ed.
1987).
176. Merges, supra note 12, at 1064.
177. Id. Creation of the FDA, the agency entrusted to regulate food and drugs, al-
lowed courts to consider only functional utility of an invention. Appropriately, clinical
safety is now left to the regulators. Merges, supra note 12, at 1064.
178. For example, a genetically engineered pig that could produce human hemoglo-
bin would, arguably, be a major benefit to the chronic blood shortages throughout the
world. See Andrews, supra note 8, at D5 (indicating that DNX Corporation is pursuing
human hemoglobin production in pigs).
179. Id. at 1068. See, e.g., In re Application of Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1398-99
(C.C.P.A. 1969) (finding that although the antidepressant drug for which a patent was
requested was suspended by the FDA for safety reasons, that was immaterial to grant of
the patent).
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Each of the above-mentioned concerns will be individually ad-
dressed in terms of their relevance to the purpose of the patent system,
the reality of biological systems and the fallibility of human premoni-
tion. Moreover, the perceived cause and effect relationship between
biotechnological patents and other events will be evaluated.
A. The Morality of Animal Patenting Issues
1. Animal Patents Will Cause a Loss of Species Integrity
The first moral issue that arises in the context of animal patents is
the concern that animal patents will cause a loss of species integrity.
The fallacy in this concern, however, is the assumption that species are
separate and distinct.180 They are not. A species ability to survive is
dependent on a diverse and dynamic gene pool.18 1 Unlike classic se-
lective breeding, genetic engineering may allow selection of a single
genetic attribute without loss of overall genetic diversity.182
Similarly, the perception that genetic engineering will result in a loss
of species integrity is fallacious and fails to comport with biological
reality. The distinct lines that divide species are not an inviolate law of
nature. In fact, the very classification of distinct species is a man-made
contrivance.1 as From the initial publication of The Origin of SpecieslS
4
in 1859, to the current day, variation within species has been recog-
nized as fundamental to nature.1 8 5 Species, by their very essence, exist
within a continuum of constant transition.186 The taxonomic classifi-
cation system that categorizes species into distinct groups is only a
framework-a scientific paradigm-that allows biologists to better un-
derstand our world.18 7 It is not a definition of the living world. More-
over, scientific evidence suggests that interspecies breeding is more
frequent than once thought.1 8 8 This interspecies breeding serves as a
natural method to introduce new genetic material into a species when
180. Recombinant DNA Research; Proposed Actions Under Guidelines, 49 Fed.
Reg. 37,016 (1984). An excerpt from this letter states: "The crossing of species borders
and the incorporation of genetic traits from one species directly into the germ line of
another species represents a fundamental assault on the principle of species integrity
and violates the right of every species to exist as a separate, identifiable creature." Id. at
37,017.
181. See, e.g., THE WONDERS OF LIFE ON EARTH 47 (Life & Lincoln Barnett eds.,
1960).
182. PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
183. See generally PHILIP APPLEMAN, DARWIN 98 (1970).
184. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
185. APPLEMAN, supra note 183, at 98.
186. PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 14.
187. Dresser, supra note 98, at 413.
188. Peter R. Grant & B. Rosemary Grant, Hybridization of Bird Species, 256 Sci. 193-94
(1992).
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environmental conditions require the option of adaptation or
extinction.189
Biotechnology provides for the creation of animals with new genetic
attributes in a more controlled manner. 190 It also provides for repair
of faulty attributes. Unlike traditional breeding methods, which also
allow the selection of specific attributes, transgenic animals may pos-
sess genetic traits not typically found in the species.191 It is this ability
to expand an animal's genetic make-up by introducing genetic mate-
rial from an unrelated species that causes the most concern. 92
Ironically, advocates of "species integrity" are not equally vocal about
the harmful effect of narrowing the gene pool through natural, con-
trolled breeding.'93 Classic selective breeding produces proven detri-
mental results through uncontrolled selection for more than one trait
at a time. Problems have arisen, for example, in Arabian horses when
breeding for a desired "look" and "type" of animal inadvertently intro-
duced an hereditary immune disease that strips afflicted horses of their
immune system, resulting in an effect similar to the AIDS virus. 94 An
estimated twenty-six percent of the Arabian horse population carries
this gene and essentially all animals afflicted with this recessive gene
die by six months of age.' 95 This unintended breeding result is only
one of many debilitating diseases that afflict domestic animals exposed
to human selective intervention.19 6 Genetic engineering, on the other
hand, potentially avoids these problems by allowing expression of a
single desirable trait without concomitant selection of others.197
Opposition to animal patents based on concern over loss of "species
integrity" fails to recognize the scope of the problem. In the natural
world, species diversity provides the best chance for survival. Genetic
engineering allows an alternative means to attain the desired results of
classical breeding while minimizing the potential for narrowing the
189. Id. at 197.
190. See generally Ina Hoeschele, Potential Gain from Insertion of Major Genes into Dairy
Cattle, 73J. DAIRY SCI. 2601, 2603 (1990). To date, there are two common methods for
insertion of genes from one specie into another: pronuclear injection("PI") and re-
troviral ("RV") vectors. The former technique is used in mammals, the latter more
frequently in birds.
191. Jones, supra note 27, at 875.
192. PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 97.
193. Boyce Rensberger, A Rescue Mission for Dying Breeds: U.N. Program Targets Indigi-
nous Farm Animals, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 1992, at A3 (discussing the absence of protest
over the extinction of many domesticated animals from controlled breeding).
194. Roger M. Genetzky et al., Combined Immunodeficiency in an Arabian Filly, 7 THE
COMPENDIUM ON COMNUING EDUCATION S319 (1985).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Gary Wilkes, Dogs Have Quirks That Don't Show On Pedigree, STAR TiuB.
(Mpls.),July 6, 1993, at 7E (identifying Dalmatian dog breeding that selects for appear-
ance only, but also carries the gene for nerve deafness, a common Dalmatian disorder).
197. See PATENTING LIFE, supra note 1, at 97.
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gene pool. The significant difference between the two is that genetic
engineering does so within a more controlled environment. There-
fore, concern for species integrity will not be served by denial of
animal patents. Effective regulation of both traditional and recombi-
nant gene selection is necessary, but it must be evenly applied.
2. Animal Patents Will Lead to the Devaluation of Human Life
Patent opponents also fear the possibility of creating human-animal
hybrids which, they contend, is intrinsically immoral.198 As a result of
our ability to transfer genes of one mammal into another, some fear
that animals will be created with enough human genes to be "partially-
human" creatures.1 9 9 At the core of this concern is the issue of defin-
ing what it means to be human, a concept we have always taken for
granted. 200 The definition may challenge the validity of our cultural
assumption that humans are superior beings.20 1
Opponents disregard the fact that the rationale and incentive for
biotechnological innovation has been recognition of the value of
human life. Both humans and animals suffering from previously incur-
able diseases now have hope for new therapies and even cures.2 0
2 It is
because of the high esteem afforded life that we must allow the bene-
fits of our skill and knowledge to enhance the human condition; we
cannot let it be stifled by some irrational notion of what "human" re-
ally means. Despite fears of harm posed by patenting biotechnology,
society continues to demonstrate a need for new treatment methods.
The answer, therefore, is not suppression, but regulation.
Although the technology that would allow transfer of large blocks of
human genes into animals is not presently within our grasp, consider,
arguendo, that human-animal hybrids are ready for patenting. How
should the risks be evaluated? One technique is to compare the poten-
tial harms of biotechnology with known risks of other harmful technol-
ogies. One commentator has compared the issuance of animal patents
with the issuance of patents on nuclear technology.203 Nuclear tech-
nology patents are granted in the same way as are patents in other
technologies,204 but they are reviewed and regulated by the Depart-
ment of Defense.205
198. Dresser, supra note 98, at 415.
199. Id. Some observers fear that this capability will reduce "people to a set of malle-
able molecules that can be interchanged with those of species that people regard as
inferior." Id.
200. Id. at 415-16.
201. Id.
202. See Roberts, supra note 35, at 906 (discussing research that suggests many dis-
eases that originate in the liver may be candidates for gene therapy).
203. Merges, supra note 12, at 1066-67.
204. Id. at 1066.
205. Id.
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Through regulation, the goal of the patent system in the nuclear
area becomes clear: It is not to stifle development of the technology,
but rather to keep the technology out of the hands of those with harm-
ful intent.206 Comparison of genetic engineering with nuclear tech-
nology also elucidates the potential ills that biotechnology might foist
upon society. As one commentator noted, "The nuclear saga teaches
society harsh lessons about the need for caution in encountering pow-
erful new technologies."20 7 This caution underscores the need for reg-
ulation to control harmful proliferation. Thus, prophylaxis against a
genetic parade of horribles requires a realistic approach to regulation,
not blanket inhibition of the technology.
Patent law history offers many examples of technologies that are ca-
pable of both good and evil.2 08 The fact that harm may arise from
misuse of an invention is not sufficient grounds to deny a patent. On
the contrary, it is a valid reason to strengthen regulatory mechanisms.
It is intellectually facile to sit back and ponder potential evils of tech-
nology, but these armchair inquiries must be balanced against real life
successes. A true vision of morality looks at both sides of the issue.
3. Animal Patenting Will Cause Increased Animal Suffering
Many opponents to animal patenting also fear that the research re-
quired by these patents will lead to increased animal suffering. These
concerns have been raised both at Congressional hearings209 and by
plaintiffs in the courts. 210 However, in neither instance was it shown
that animal patents are more likely than not to lead to increased
animal suffering. In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, the court
noted that these were regulatory issues and, as such, already addressed
by federal statute.2 1 1 Some animal suffering concerns may in fact be
better prevented by permitting animal patenting.
206. Id. at 1067.
207. Attanasio, supra note 169, at 683.
208. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 12, at 1062 (discussing inventions that are neither
good or evil in and of themselves and suggesting that their use determines their moral
character).
209. See Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63 (1987) (statement of John Hoyt, Humane Society of the
United States) (testifying about concerns that animal patents will increase animal
suffering).
210. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920,925 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Plain-
tiffs asserted that they were harmed as a result of the Commissioner's statement, be-
cause their efforts to prevent injury to farm and laboratory animals would be frustrated.
Id.
211. The court stated, "[F]or increased experimentation to lead to increased cruelty,
appellants would have to allege that the existing animal cruelty laws are insufficient or
that the issuance of 'animal' patents would 'encourage' researchers to disobey these
laws." Id. at 937.
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A frequently cited example of the harmful effects of genetic engi-
neering has been the incorporation of the bovine growth hormone
gene into pigs. 2 12 This gene promotes an increased lean to fat ratio
that produces a more wholesome meat product.2 13 Animals expres-
sing the gene, however, have correlated increases in health and fertility
problems. 2 14 Transgenic offspring that expressed the gene were found
to be lethargic, arthritic, and to have an increased vulnerability to
stress,2 15 thus reducing their market value. As discussed earlier, the
function of the patent system is to provide economic incentive for in-
novative activity, not to produce economic idiots.216 Products with lit-
tle market value will either stimulate additional research to perfect, or
at least improve, the product, or inhibit release of the product into the
marketplace. 2 17
Unfortunately, transgenics success stories are less frequently men-
tioned. Consider, for example, the genetically engineered transgenic
chicken that resists avian leukemia virus.218 The incorporated gene
not only results in healthier birds but it saves the industry an estimated
$50 to $100 million per year.2 19
Similar to these claims involving farm animals, the argument that
animal patents may cause increased suffering of nonfood producing
animals is likewise questionable. 220 This argument erroneously
presumes that nongenetically engineered laboratory animals are not
used in laboratory research. We have long allowed, and even con-
doned, a limited amount of animal suffering for the benefit of society
at large. Opponents of animal patents ignore the counterargument
that creation of animals with specific desirable traits will likely decrease
the overall number of animals suffering by decreasing the amount of
animals needed to constitute a statistically significant research popula-
tion.22 1 But, as in the case of the "Harvard Mouse," the fact that a
single mouse now has an increased chance of cancer is in itself a more
212. See generally Dresser, supra note 98, at 422; Hoeschele, supra note 190, at 2613;
Jones, supra note 27, at 880; PATENTnNG LIFE, supra note 1, at 106; Pursel et al., Genetic
Engineering of Livestock, 244 Sci. 1281, 1282 (1989).
213. Pursel, supra note 212, at 1282.
214. Id. at 1284.
215. Id. However, these same symptoms, to a somewhat lesser degree, are wide-
spread in the general swine population as a result of traditional breeding methods. Id.
at 1285.
216. See supra part III.A.
217. See supra part III.A.1. Animals with the pathological conditions of the pigs con-
stitute a high commercial risk and negate the potential for economic gain by marketing
in the agricultural industry. Hoeschele, supra note 190, at 2613.
218. Gladwell, supra note 7, at E3.
219. Id.
220. PATENTING LirE, supra note 1, at 134-35.
221. Id.
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fundamental moral question.2 22 This concern is real and is subsumed
by the essential issue of sacrificing animal life for human life.
Whether it is morally correct to sacrifice an animal life for a human
life is an issue that transcends the context of animal patenting. As
stated by one Congressional witness, "When compared with the ethical
issues involved in our breeding, buying, selling, confining, eating, and
performing research on animals, the ethical questions surrounding
animal patents seem relatively less important. "223 Nonetheless, these
are important issues and society must ultimately decide how to regu-
late the humane treatment of animals. Denial of animal patents, how-
ever, is not part of the solution. Whether animal suffering should be
permitted and whether animals should be patented are completely dif-
ferent issues.
4. Animal Patenting Will Cause Commercialization of Academic
Research
Another argument in the morality-based attack claims that animal
patents will lead to increased commercialization of academic re-
search.2 24 This line of argument predicts: (1) impeded scientific pro-
gress as the result of the secrecy of pending patent 225 technology;22 6
(2) attrition of basic research as the result of financial incentives induc-
ing academic researchers into commercially profitable areas;2 2 7 and
(3) financial windfalls to corporations that build on knowledge gener-
ated through tax-supported research.228 Although these events likely
will occur, this eventuality is not the result of animal patenting, but of
market economics and express Congressional intention.
These changes in academic research will occur for several reasons.
First, new products generated by biotechnology create markets that did
not previously exist. With each new market comes new commercial
opportunities, which is precisely the tenet on which the free market
222. Id.
223. Dresser, supra note 98, at 423-24.
224. Id. at 419; Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1018.
225. Although patents encourage disclosure, the Patent Act precludes patenting any
invention known or published more than one year prior to the inventor's invention
date, or known or published more than one year prior to the applicant's date of filing
for a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1993). Hence, an inventor may-and should-
refrain from disclosing an invention until after publicly filing the patent application.
Once filed, a patent application typically takes about eighteen months to be granted, at
which time disclosure is then made available to the public. PATENT & TRADEMARK OF-
FICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT vii (1992).
226. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1017 (stating that the idea that patents will
.promote scientific progress is counter-intuitive to many observers of research sci-
ence"); Dresser, supra note 98, at 419-20 ("patenting will create a need for secrecy
among academic researchers").
227. Dresser, supra note 98, at 421.
228. Id. at 420.
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system rests. Changes in academic research may also occur because
the federal government has expressly legislated to foster these
changes. 22 9 That is, after all, why we elect our representative offi-
cials-to legislate in ways that will benefit society.
Although these effects may occur, patents themselves are not wholly
to blame. For example, animal patents do not contribute to increased
secrecy in technological advancement; they are merely a means to
maintain proprietary rights in a commodity for which a societal need,
as reflected by a commercial market, has arisen. In fact, without the
subsequent protection of a patent, researchers would have an incentive
to keep major discoveries secret until the discoveries could be com-
mercialized as is required under trade secret law. Therefore, animal
patents arose from the same factors that provoked an increase in se-
crecy: the creation of a commercial market that reflects societal needs.
Once a commercial market for a product is established, there arises
an incentive to maintain proprietary rights as long as possible to maxi-
mize economic benefit.2 30 Hence, the transfer of knowledge is not im-
peded by the patent system, but by the desire to control the economic
value in a product by protecting proprietary rights. Thus, only by elim-
inating the societal need for biotechnology will the market dissipate so
that inventors will no longer have a reason to protect their intellectual
products. As long as the market endures, biotechnology will continue,
but without patent protections it will continue in secret. It is possible,
therefore, that denying animal patents may only exacerbate the conse-
quences of secrecy in academic research.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to blame animal patenting for effects
intended by express Congressional enactment. The Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act of 1980,231 the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,232
and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986233 were specifically
enacted to promote national competitiveness. 23 4 The Stevenson-Wyd-
ler Act was enacted to promote commercialization of inventions from
federally funded research. 23 5 The Bayh-Dole established uniformity in
229. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1980); Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785.
230. See, e.g., Gautam Naik, Cellular Phone Rates Spark Static from Users, WALL ST. J.,
May 5, 1994, at B1. Explaining the cellular phone industry's failure to lower consumer
prices in light of the industry's decreasing costs, an industry representative noted, "Cel-
lular firms clearly have room to lower prices. But they know they have competition
coming. So you get your margins while you can." Id.
231. 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1980).
232. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-210.
233. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
234. Bill Mandates Contractor Ownership of IP Rights from Federal R&D Pacts, 46 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., (BNA) 507 (Oct. 14, 1993). [hereinafter MANDATE]
235. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-210.
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patenting inventions resulting from federally-funded research, and en-
couraged commercialization of these inventions.236 The Federal Tech-
nology Transfer Act established a process for cooperative research and
development agreements between government-controlled laboratories
and private sector industry.237 Both the Stevenson-Wydler Act and the
Federal Technology Transfer Act were enacted to increase joint re-
search between federally funded laboratories and private sector indus-
try and to promote the transfer of federally supported scientific
research into the commercial marketplace. 238
Academic research is indeed commercialized, but not as the result
of animal patents. Commercialization occurs because there is a socie-
tal demand for the product and because Congress has specifically legis-
lated for it. Therefore, by denying animal patents based on these
perceived ills, we shift the attention from the true sources of stifled
research-the free market and lack of proper regulation.
B. The Economics of Animal Patents
Concern with the economics of animal patenting have been raised
by both sides. Opponents contend that animal patents will bring about
the economic demise of the family farm.23 9 Proponents contend that
the denial of animal patents will bring about the demise of a biotech-
nology industry.2 40 In reality, neither argument is relevant to the
PTO's purpose in issuing patents.
The PTO does not determine patentability based on the economic
value of an invention.241 It has been well recognized, since the Consti-
tution was drafted, that the economic value of an invention is indeter-
minable at the time the patent is initially granted.24 2 In fact, the ability
to predict any economic worth, much less the ultimate worth, is almost
impossible at the time of patent.243 An invention's economic worth is
236. H. REP. No. 1307, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1980).
237. MANDATE, supra note 235 at 507.
238. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra
note 29, at 6.
239. Dresser, supra note 98, at 417.
240. See Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 117, 118 (1987) (statement of A. Ann Sorenson, Assistant Direc-
tor, Natural & Environmental Resources Division, American Farm Bureau Federation)
(testifying in favor of animal patents as necessary to international competition).
241. See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that patentability
has nothing to do with commercial value).
242. Hamilton & Till, supra note 41, at 247-48. And there has been no reason since
to question this premise.
243. Consider, for example, the French military commander who said in 1911, "Air-
planes are interesting toys but have no military value." Dick Youngblood, Ideas for New
Products Stretch the Imagination, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Nov. 1, 1992, at 2D. In the 1920s,
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determined by the free market, not by the patent system. 244 If society
determines that an invention has no use, there is no economic market
value,245 and the invention will be limited by its own inherent
worthlessness.
2 46
The economics of patenting is fundamental to the patent system,
but it plays no role in determining whether a patent should be
granted. The societal benefit for patent-stimulated advancement was
aptly noted in 1948 by one commentator who stated that "the useful
arts stand at the very center of the economy."247 Unfortunately, the
issues of patents and economics have been obfuscated in the animal
patenting debate. Instead of considering patents in terms of their eco-
nomic benefits to society, the debate has been staged in the context of
the economic effects of animal patents in two major industries: the
United States farm industry and the biotechnology industry.
Most animal patent opponents that raise economic concerns repre-
sent the agriculture sector 248 and contend that continued animal pat-
enting will lead to the demise of the family farm.249 This argument is
based on two major premises: (1) animal patenting will lead to higher
priced animals that will be available only to corporate farmers, putting
the family farmer at an economic disadvantage; and (2) animal patent-
one of the movie industry's Warner brothers said of "talkie" movies, "Who wants to hear
an actor talk?" Id. IBM Chairman Thomas Watson predicted in 1943 "a [total) world
market for about five computers." Id. Most significant, however, is the 1899 prognosti-
cation by the then director of the PTO who announced that "[e]verything that can be
invented has been invented." Id. Based on our track record, now would seem an inap-
propriate time to start asking the patent office.to make the economic determination of
an invention a criteria for patentability.
244. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1028.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Hamilton & Till, supra note 41, at 259.
248. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 923 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In contrast, the economic concerns of medical and laboratory animal interests strongly
favor patenting. See, e.g., Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1987) (statement by Dr. Thomas Wagner, Edison
Animal Biotechnology Center, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio) (testifying that medical
and pharmaceutical research will greatly benefit from transgenic animal production).
Interestingly, many farm organizations including the American Farm Bureau Fed-
eration, which claims approximately 80% of American farmers as members, have gone
on record in support of granting animal patents. A. Ann Sorenson, Perspectives of Farm-
ers, in ANIMAL PATENTS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES 117, 124 (William H.
Lesser ed., 1989).
249. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 932; see also Patents and the Constitution:
Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adminis-
tration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 117, 119 (1987)
(statement of Dr. A. Ann Sorenson, Assistant Director, Natural & Environmental Re-
sources Divisions, American Farm Bureau Federation) (testifying that Patent Office pol-
icy should not be used in an attempt to prevent the displacement of family farms).
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ing will produce animals with increased production efficiency, reduc-
ing the number of farmers needed.250 Assuming, arguendo, that both
premises are true, they are nonetheless irrelevant to the animal patent
issue and contrary to common logic.
The patent system exists to bring new products and ideas to the mar-
ket by offering economic incentives to inventors.2 51 Obviously, a pre-
dictable result of the patent system is that new technology will
foreclose the need for antiquated technology.2 52 Although it is unfor-
tunate that increasing farming efficiency will drive more farmers out of
business, other new technologies in farming have already had the ef-
fect of causing fewer and larger farms.253 Animal patents are not
unique in that regard.254 Making a sector of industry more efficient is
the constitutional purpose of the patent system. Denial of patents for
this reason would completely contravene the constitutional purpose of
the patent system.
On the other hand, biotechnology experts argue that without the
security of patents, their industry will flounder. This, too, is not rele-
vant to the PTO. What is relevant is whether biotechnology is constitu-
tionally intended to be promoted through patent protection. It is.
This contention is supported by both Congress and the Supreme
Court.255
Economic considerations affect animal patenting in only a very lim-
ited way. The appropriateness of animal patents does not rely on the
economic value of the invention. Even opponents to animal patenting
admit to this view. The significance of economics is limited to whether
an invention may possibly benefit society which, at the time of patent-
ing, is rarely known. Thus, it is important to deflect attention from
speculative, economic concerns and toward the heart of the issue:
whether we want the technology produced in animal patenting to be
part of the current world within which we live.
250. American Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 932; see also Patents and the Constitution:
Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adminis-
tration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 350, 350 (1987)
(statement of Russ Weisensel, Wisconsin Agribusiness Council) (testifying that the cor-
porate farms feared today are the same as those feared in the 1930s: the farms that
market the top bloodlines for livestock available to the small farmer); LESSER, supra note
21, at 83 ("Whenever productivity improvement has come about as the result of previ-
ous new technologies the effect has been fewer and larger farms.").
251. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
252. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1038.
253. LESSER, supra note 21, at 83.
254. The "warped logic" of denying biotechnological advancements that would im-
prove farming efficiency should likewise be extended to outlaw plows, tractors, and
fertilizers. Malcolm S. Forbes, Ignorance Triumphs, FoRBES, May 28, 1990, at 19.
255. See supra part IV.A. and notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
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C. The Paradigmatic Reality
Evaluating the arguments against animal patents leads to one indis-
putable conclusion: animal patents are not the cause of the perceived
ills, thus denying animal patents will not eliminate them. The more
compelling concerns lie within the technology which the patent pro-
tects. Opposition to biotechnology does not stem from the known im-
mense benefit it will bring but from the specter of possible havoc that
might result if humans use the technology for mischievous purposes.
Biotechnology has shifted the paradigm within which humans exist.
Those who challenge animal patents are struggling against the para-
digmatic shift. Their arguments reinforce the notion that society fa-
vors familiar paradigms.2 5 6 But, human evolution demonstrates that
paradigms serve a valuable function only until they become
obsolete.
2 57
Attempts to suppress paradigmatic challenges that cause a reevalua-
tion of human positioning are as old as the species itself. For example,
in 1633, Galileo Galilei was suppressed by the Catholic Church for his
heretical view that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the uni-
verse. 258 To avoid the rack, Galileo recanted his findings.259 After ris-
ing from kneeling before his inquisitors he is rumored to have
muttered "E pur, si muove" - "Even so, it does move." 260 Three hun-
dred fifty nine years later, in 1992, the Catholic Church admitted error
in condemning Galileo.26 1 It is time to realize that even with suppres-
sion of animal patents, biotechnology too, will move.
Human evolution advanced through our dominance over the
animal kingdom. 262 Harnessing animal power through domestication
was a first step to becoming a social being.263 Now, we are taking the
next inevitable step. Genetic engineering is an inescapable extension
of human domination over the environment. Because it renders as
obsolete our old, familiar paradigms, many are rallying to fight the
change. Such opposition, however, is not new; it occurs whenever our
paradigms shift.
256. See KUHN, supra note 2, at 10-51.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 211.
259. Id. at 216.
260. Pope Ready to Admit Church's Error in Condemning Galileo, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Oct.
31, 1992, at llA.
261. Id.
262. BRONOWSKI, supra note 4, at 79-80.
The horse had begun by drawing wheeled carts, like the ox - but rather
grander, drawing chariots in the processions of kings. And then, somewhere
around 2000 BC, men discovered how to ride it. The idea must have been as
startling in its day as the invention of the flying machine.
Id.
263. Id. at 60.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The patent system was established to stimulate innovation for the
benefit of society. Society benefits when its needs are fulfilled; biotech-
nology fulfills a vital societal need. But the patent system was not
designed to regulate the inventions it promotes. Denial of animal pat-
ents will not suppress speculative harm, though it may hinder the de-
velopment of regulatory measures that would reduce the threat of
harm. The most responsible way to minimize harm and maximize ben-
efits is through regulation based on complete disclosure. Indeed, this
is what the patent system was designed to do.
The purpose of the patent system as envisioned by the Constitution
is quite simple. It is not to judge, it is not to regulate, it is not to
speculate; it is to stimulate society to innovate for its own benefit. To
require the patent system to make moral or economic judgments
before issuing a patent entrusts the key to society's technological fu-
ture to this one gatekeeper. Technological advancement is too impor-
tant to our survival to be limited to the discretion of one governmental
office; society as a whole should judge the moral or economic worth of
a technological advancement.
The grant of a patent on a living mammal symbolizes the power of
biotechnology. As a result of genetic engineering, humans are able to
produce animals that are sufficiently unique to be considered patenta-
ble. Hence, through means previously unimaginable, humans have
created new animal life. In essence, we have acquired a power that
requires us to expand the paradigm within which we view ourselves in
relation to the rest of the living world. We fear this; expanding the
scope of the paradigm in terms of human preeminence forces us to
consider our own fallibility.
Acknowledging our fallibility can be positive. It helps to perpetuate
our survival and secures us in our role in the universe. However, it cuts
both ways. Although we may cause harm by tampering with powerful
technologies, we may provoke equal harm if, in our ignorance, we fail
to recognize the full potential of its benefits. Thus, there is only one
viable option: not to suppress technology, but to stimulate it. Society
needs this technology. At the same time, society needs strong regula-
tion to prevent harm from misuse. Open disclosure of emerging new
technologies must be shared with the public and this is exactly what
the patent system was designed to do. Whether the consequence of
research be mice or machine, the patent system must remain the same.
James K. Chiapetta, D. VM.
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